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A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. 
SKELLY WRIGHT. By Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xiv, 242. $29.95. 
ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY: SELECTED NONJUDICIAL WRITINGS 
OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. Edited by Arthur Selwyn Miller. Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xvi, 291. $29.95. 
During a thirty-seven year tenure as a federal judge, J. Skelly 
Wright has drawn both criticism and acclaim for his views on the role 
of judges and their use of discretion in adjudication. His personal 
roots are in the deep South. It was there that he started his legal ca-
reer as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in 1936, a position he attained 
largely because of the influence of a relative who was a New Orleans 
politician. However, Wright's association with the political elite of 
Louisiana wiis shattered when he ll:isisted, as a young district judge, 
that the New Orleans school district ra,cially desegregate its school 
system in order to conform with the Sµpreme Court ruling in Brown v. 
Board of Education. 1 
The desegregation cases brought Skelly Wright to the attention of 
John Kennedy, who later appointed hirp to the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in 1962. Arthur Selwyn Miller2 be-
lieves that Wright has come to be "the best known of all federal 
judges, except, of course, those on the Supreme Court" (p. xiv).3 
A "Capacity for Outrage" is structured so that Skelly Wright's (and 
Miller's) views on different areas of substantive law and the challenges 
facing American society are discussed on~. at a time. Racial equality, 
the constitutional role of administrative l,aw in modern America, the 
rise of the "Nationa,l Security State" after the Second World War, per-
sonal autonomy, and crime are eac;p. a(\l~resse4 separately. Yet these 
separate chapters are only conveiiiep.t. ·pigeonholes for grouping to-
gether similar cases or disputes. The book's main themes are devel-
oped continuously and transcend the discrete categories found in the 
table of contents. 
The central focus of the book is, not surprisingly, Judge Wright's 
judicial activism and his related con,cern for social justice. Miller ar-
gues that judges have more discretion than the formalities of the 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1!154). 
2. Arthur Selwyn Mill.er is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Washington University and 
Adjunct professor of Law at Nova University Center for.the Study of Law. He has previously 
published DEMOCRACTlC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CoNSTITUTION OF CONTROL 
(1981); THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE: PR~VATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1976); S,OCIAL CHANGE AND FU.NDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING 
CONSTITUTION (1979); TJIE SUPREME CoURT: MYTH 4N.O REALITY (1978); and TOWARD IN-
CREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: :rHE PoLmCAL ROLJ> OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982). 
3. All parenthetical page references are to A '.'Capacity far Outrage." 
' 
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American legal system appear to provide for them (p. 19). He rejects 
the assumption that "principled reasoning" and reliance on commu-
nity consensus are honest approaches to jurisprudence. He refers to 
this reliance on abstract notions of law as "intellectual dishonesty" 
because it only shrouds personal predilections that are always at work 
in a judge's decisionmaking process (pp. 32-35). 
Miller cites as an example of the traditional "restrained" judicial 
approach the first of two cases that J. Skelly Wright argued before the 
Supreme Court. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 4 Wright rep-
resented a black teenager on a petition for habeas corpus after a 
botched execution failed to kill him. The primary target of Miller's 
wrath is Justice Frankfurter, who voted for a second execution at-
tempt after concluding, in Miller's words, that "abstract principles of 
federalism outweighed the facts of a bungled execution" (p. 33). 
Miller also chastises Justice Jackson for rejecting his personal opinion 
about the case in the name of judicial restraint and for asserting that 
judges should be guided by "society's law." Unlike the more classical 
positions of Blackstone and Holmes (pp. 20-23), Miller stresses that 
the determination of what society's laws should be was the very issue 
before the Court and should not have been ignored by the Justices (p. 
31). 
The central theme of A "Capacity for Outrage" is that judicial 
"good deeds" should be embraced, not scorned. This is the judicial 
approach that Willie Francis' attorney later employed as a federal 
judge, in part, Miller suggests, because of his frustration with his expe-
rience in Francis. Skelly Wright himself has explained his reasons for 
approving of judicial discretion even to the point of relying on per-
sonal "hunches": 
The judicial process forces a judge to take the short run into account. ... 
[H]e must bend principles in order to produce a result he can live 
with .... The judiciary is different from the political process. It is in the 
nature of courts that they cannot close their doors to individuals seeking 
justice. [p. 35] 
The full extent of Skelly Wright's activism is made evident in 
Miller's chapter on personal autonomy. In In re President and Direc-
tors of Georgetown College, Inc., 5 Skelly Wright approved a request by 
a Washington hospital to administer a blood transfusion to an adult 
woman who had refused the transfusion because of her religious be-
liefs. Wright issued the order within hours of the hospital's request 
after a district judge down the hall had refused to intervene (p. 179). 
While this case was admittedly an emergency situation in which no 
time was available for detailed consideration, both Skelly Wright and 
Miller give questionable justifications for the intervention. Among 
4. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
5. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
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these are the woman's responsibility to care for her infant (p. 182), her 
apparent incapacity to make a rational decision (demonstrated primar-
ily by her refusal of the transfusion) (p. 181), and the possible liability 
of the hospital (p. 183). In addition, Miller makes the bizarre remark 
that the hospital should receive the blame for the intervention since, 
"with overweening arrogance," it determined what was best for the 
patient and therefore played God (p. 185). How the hospital can be 
criticized for this hubris without Skelly Wright receiving equal, if not 
greater, blame for "playing God" remains unclear. 
The true reason for Skelly Wright's decision becomes apparent 
from his discussions with students at a 1982 seminar. After being 
questioned about the legal niceties of the decision, Wright wondered 
out loud: "How much would you bet . . . that Mrs. Jones and her 
child are glad today for the decision?" (p. 186). The absence of tradi-
tional legal analysis in this statement is astounding, especially consid-
ering that both freedom of religion and privacy were involved in the 
case. Yet, irrespective of its ultimate persuasiveness, the rhetorical 
question Skelly Wright posed is powerful because of its undeniable 
sincerity. The appeal that the decision takes on in light of Skelly 
Wright's musings should cause one to consider seriously the value of 
traditional legal analysis, even in nonemergency situations where it is 
logistically possible to employ it. 
What motivates J. Skelly Wright to use such nontraditional ap-
proaches when rendering his judicial decisions? Miller offers a theory 
that he calls "Reason-Directed Societal Self-Interest." According to 
this theory, aiding disadvantaged individuals benefits the entire com-
munity by bridging the chasm between different classes and thereby 
yielding greater social stability. 
Miller finds examples of this concern for society as well as the indi-
vidual in Wright's passion for equality and his awareness that equality 
is valuable to the advantaged as well as the oppressed. In striking 
down a Washington, D.C., school district scheme to group students by 
skill because it would result in further de facto discrimination, Wright 
wrote: "What supports this call is our horror at inflicting any further 
injury on the Negro ... and also our common need of the schools to 
serve as the public agency for neutralizing and normalizing race rela-
tions in this country. "6 
Although both the first and last chapters clearly indicate that this 
book is, in fact, about Judge Wright, it is obvious that to a certain 
extent Skelly Wright is used merely as a vehicle to present Miller's 
views on the role of judges and law in solving the continuing problems 
of our society.7 Certainly, Skelly Wright is a good choice for Miller 
6. P. 58 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)) (emphasis in original). 
7. Many of Miller's own ideas have been discussed in his earlier works. See, e.g., Miller, 
"Constitutionalizing" the Corporation, 22 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 95 
878 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:861 
since Wright appears to approximate the paradigm judge for his con-
cept of ideal adjudication. Nevertheless, the book leaves one with the 
sense that the attempt to discover J. Skelly Wright got lost amidst the 
theoretical constructs created by Arthur Selwyn Miller. This observa-
tion is not intended to question the value of the book per se, but 
merely to caution the reader not to expect a report of the professional 
experiences of J. Skelly Wright. 
A corollary to the above criticism is that A "Capacity for Outrage" 
does not focus on what Wright himself thinks. However, Miller's 
work provides a useful introduction to the companion volume, On 
Courts and Democracy, which does present Wright's own views di-
rectly. On Courts and Democracy contains nine articles written by 
Skelly Wright that were originally published between 1965 and 1982. 
While they represent less than one-sixth of his total nonjudicial writ-
ings, 8 they are the primary articles that Miller refers to in A "Capacity 
for Outrage" and follow the same general themes pursued by Miller. 
Free speech in the context of c~paign financing,9 school desegrega-
tion, 10 affirmative action, 11 judicial review of administrative deci-
sions, 12 and judicial activism in general13 are the issues presented by 
the articles included here - just as they are in the other volume. 
On Courts and Democracy provides a convenient collection of arti-
cles that are useful if the reader chooses to evaluate Skelly Wright 
without either the assistance or interference of Miller. In addition, 
each article is prefaced by a small note that introduces the article and 
places it in the context of Miller's interpretation of Judge Wright's 
philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the compilation of essays in On Courts and Democ-
racy does not appear to add much to the literature about Skelly 
Wright. A "Capacity for Outrage" does create a desire for a firsthand 
examination of the judge's views and, in this sense, the collection of 
(1982); Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary on First Na-
tional Bank v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21 (1981); Miller, Toward a Concept of Consti-
tutional Duty, 1968 SUP. Cr. REV. 199; Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U. 
DAITON L. REv. 633 (1983); see also note 2 supra. 
8. See ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 283-85 for a complete list of Skelly Wright's writings. 
9. P. 73, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); p. 97, 
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982). 
10. P. 167, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 285 (1965). 
11. P. 195, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI, L. REV. 213 
(1980). 
12. P. 137, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 
(1980); p. 231, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 COR· 
NELL L. REv. 375 (1974); p. 257, Beyond,Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972). 
13. P. 3, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society - Judicial Activism or 
Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968); p. 33, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and 
the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). 
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writings is a natural companion to it. However, Miller's own book 
gives adequate direction to the original sources of the articles in this 
collection. As might be expected, these sources are not obscure. Fur-
thermore, while Miller's comments about each article offer interesting 
opinions about Wright's views and insight into the impetus for the 
articles, A "Capacity for Outrage" already explains Miller's opinions. 
In the final analysis, On Courts and Democracy satisfies a curiosity 
created by A "Capacity for Outrage, " but a relatively easy trip to the 
library might serve as well. 
Perhaps A "Capacity for Outrage" can best be described as a syn-
thesis of earlier works by Miller14 ·and recent tributes to J. Skelly 
Wright. 15 The reader who is more interested in a biography of Skelly 
Wright than in a theoretical evaluation of what Skelly Wright means 
to law and adjudication may be better off skippping Miller's book and 
reading instead Michael Bernick's brief outline of his life and career.16 
Moreover, the book is essentially a testimonial to the career and 
tenacity of Skelly Wright, despite Miller's avowed intention not to 
"paint a portrait of 'Saint Skelly' " (p. xiii). As such, A "Capacity for 
Outrage" probably will not bridge the gap between the advocates of 
judicial activism and judicial restraint. However, while agreement 
with the views expressed by Miller will largely depend on the reader's 
own predisposition toward the proper role of the judiciary, A "Capac-
ity for Outrage" should be recognized by all as a fine analysis of Skelly 
Wright as well as a solid contribution to the continuing debate over 
judicial activism. 
- Alan M Koschik 
14. See note 7 supra. 
15. See 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 857-999 (1980) (numerous tributes to, or evaluations of, J. 
Skelly Wright). 
16. Bernick, The Unusual Odyssey of J. Skelly Wright, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 971 (1980). 
